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JUDGES, LEGISLATORS, AND EUROPE'S LAW: COMMON-LAW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FOREIGN PRECEDENTS 
NOGA MORAG-LEVINE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The global emergence of powerful, politically assertive courts has 
redefined the process and meaning of legal transplantation. With the 
rise of powerful judiciaries outside the United States, court opinions 
have emerged as a novel avenue for cross-national importation of law. 
In this environment, newly created or emboldened courts can draw 
inspiration from statutes of other countries and the opinions of for-
eign judges. Courts were encouraged in this direction over the past 
two decades by a growing sense of community among members of the 
judiciary worldwide. 1 A distinctive result has been a marked increase 
in the prevalence of citation to foreign court opinions on the part of a 
growing number of national supreme courts and international adjudi-
cative bodies.2 The U.S. Supreme Court has been comparatively slow 
to follow this trend.3 Nonetheless, it is in the United States that the 
practice of citing foreign precedents seems to have met with the great-
est controversy. The role of foreign law in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence is currently the topic of extensive discussion on the Internet, in 
the press, in academic journals, and in Congress. A number of Su-
preme Court Justices have addressed the issue directly in their opin-
ions,4 and, more unusually, in off the bench writings and speeches.5 
* Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law. Andrew Barnes, Bar-
bara Bean, and Jennifer Logan Tilden provided excellent assistance in researching this 
Essay. Thanks to participants in the Maryland/Georgetown Constitutional Law SchmooU! for 
helpful comments. 
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARv. INT'L LJ. 191, 192-94 
(2003). 
2. SeeSujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory ofCompara-
tive Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. LJ. 819, 820-21 (1999) (noting the growing use of 
comparative jurisprudence in constitutional interpretation in courts outside of the United 
States); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. 
REv. 99, 99-100 (1994) (enumerating examples of citations to foreign courts by national 
courts and international adjudicative bodies). 
3. Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning andJudicial Review, 28 YALE]. INT'L L. 409, 
410 (2003); Rebecca Lefler, Note, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as 
Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the High 
Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 165, 166 (2001). 
4. See infra Part IV. 
5. In January 2005, Justices Breyer and Scalia participated in a televised public forum 
on "The Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional Adjudication." For tran-
32 
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The controversy is perplexing in part because it appears to be 
restricted to the United States. There is little evidence to suggest par-
allel mobilization in opposition to foreign citations by courts abroad.6 
Moreover, even when viewed strictly within the parameters of Ameri-
can law and politics, the foreign citation controversy seems to deviate 
from the prevailing pattern. The Court tends to draw political fire in 
response to controversial results rather than contested modes of rea-
soning. The usual line of criticism, familiar from responses to the 
Court's decisions on abortion or flag burning, works back from a hot-
button decision to the absence of a legal basis sufficient to justify in-
terference with the decisions of the democratically elected legislative 
branch. By contrast, opposition to the citing of foreign cases puts 
front and center the Court's reasoning as such. Even if we take the 
view that opposition to foreign references serves as a proxy for sub-
stantive disagreement with the rulings, the benefits of such a strategy 
are not self-evident. If the goal was defense of criminal prohibitions 
on sodomy or thejuvenile death penalty (to take two prominent areas 
where references to foreign cases have recently appeared), why de-
flect from these politically potent issues by framing the question at 
hand in reference to the citation of foreign law? Alternatively, if we 
opt to view opposition to the Court's comparative jurisprudence in 
principled terms, the principle at stake is not simple to pinpoint. Su-
preme Court opinions are replete with references to extra-legal 
sources such as philosophical treatises and social science research.7 
Why single out foreign case law as deserving of special condemnation? 
script and video of the event, see AIltonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional 
Adjudication at American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), available 
at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm (follow "Video 
Archive from C-Span" hyperlink or "Press Release and full transcript" hyperlink). For the 
flavor of the political side of the debate, see Rick Santo rum, The Internationalist Threat to 
Americas Constitution, CRISIS, Dec. 2003, available at http://www.crisismagazine.com/de-
cember2003/hill.htm. 
6. See Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes to the Courts, PUB. INT., Winter 2004, at 3, 16, 
available at http://www.thepublicinterest.com/archives/2004winter / article l.html. Kersch 
writes: "The process of integrating international legal standards at the domestic level has 
proceeded pretty much unquestioned abroad: Most foreign judges are enthusiastic about 
integrating their law and their constitutions into an emergent and evolving world system." 
Id. Kersch argues that American judges ought not to follow in their path. Id. at 18. 
7. See generally Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Legal Positivism as Legal Informa-
tion, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1080, 1108, 1110 app. (1997) (identifying a large increase in the 
Supreme Court's use of nonlegal sources); Neomi Rao, Comment, A Backdoor to Policy Mak-
ing: The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1371, 1372-81 (1998) 
(noting a substantial increase in philosophical references by the Supreme Court in the past 
thirty years). 
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This Essay seeks the answer in American legal history. Through-
out the nineteenth century, American elites divided over the question 
of whether political and legislative principles inspired by the conti-
nental civil-law tradition were compatible with American constitution-
alism. Legal treatises, political pamphlets, and newspaper articles 
attest to the depth of disagreements regarding codification initiatives, 
social legislation, and other European-inspired reform agendas.8 Op-
ponents of such reforms offered a dual line of response based in polit-
ical theory and constitutional law: the first cast the civil-law tradition as 
an absolutist instrument of authoritarian origin, and the second 
equated constitutional due process with a closed set of common-law 
procedures and principles.9 Defined in this fashion, due process 
served to bar civil-law-based legislative reforms. 
Today's controversy bears a striking similarity to the nineteenth-
century dispute. Contemporary opponents of judicial citations to for-
eign law stress the importance of securing the boundary between 
American and European constitutionalism.10 The timing of the cur-
rent controversy is instructive in this regard. Citations to foreign judi-
cial opinions are. hardly a novel development in American 
jurisprudence. Supreme Court Justices across the nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries repeatedly referenced the views of their overseas 
English-speaking colleagues regarding the constitutional disputes of 
the day. II Opposition to the practice, however, materialized only 
once the Justices began to look beyond the common-law world for 
comparative insights. Critical attention to foreign citations in the 
United States closely tracks growth in the global influence of Euro-
pean courts, most importantly the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR). Entrusted with enforcing the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the ECHR "has become a source of authoritative pro-
nouncements on human rights law" for adjudicative bodies well be-
yond Europe, including the courts of South Mrica and Zimbabwe, 
writes Anne-Marie Slaughter. 12 This ascendancy has been matched by 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See infra notes 19-30 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (noting that the conflict between Euro-
pean legal principles and American constitutional law was present in Hurtado v. California, 
110 U.S. 516 (1884), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003». 
11. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of OUT Law, 98 AM.]. INT'L L. 43, 
45 n.14 (2004) (listing cases where the Supreme Court recognized that the concept of 
"ordered liberty" is a concept recognized in other English-speaking peoples' legal systems, 
as well as the United States). 
12. Anne-Marie Slaughter, judicial Globaliz.ation, 40 VA.]. INT'L L. 1103, 1109-10 (2000). 
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a decline in the American Supreme Court's influence on the jurispru-
dence of foreign courts. 13 
Unresolved disagreements on the legitimacy of learning from 
European public law underpin the transplantation controversies of 
both the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries. In the nineteenth- and 
early-twentieth-century story, legislation was the primary mechanism 
for the transplantation of continentally modeled law into the United 
States. 14 Opponents invoked an inherent antagonism between Ameri-
can constitutionalism and continental political systems in an effort to 
dissuade legislators from enacting continental-inspired legal reforms 
and to encourage judges to invalidate them, once passed. 15 Today, 
the roles have reversed with some judges serving as agents of trans-
plantation and some legislators guarding the gates. In this fashion, 
the current controversy offers a mirror image of nineteenth-century 
legal transplantation crises. Yet the underlying controversy over the 
fit between American and continental political values has remained 
the same. 
This thesis finds support in the prominence of references to core 
differences between Europe and America within the current debate. 
Here I offer two such examples: The first consists of arguments ad-
vanced on behalf of a congressional resolution condemning citations 
to foreign law during hearings that the Subcommittee on the Consti-
tution devoted to this topic,16 and the second is Justice Scalia's re-
sponse in Printz v. United States17 to Justice Breyer's comments on the 
structure of federalist institutions on the continent.1s Before turning 
to these contemporary examples, the following section highlights a 
few of the instances where nineteenth-century jurisprudential debates 
addressed the status of European legal and constitutional principles 
in America. 
13. Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of World 
Constitutionalism, "2000 WIS. L. REv. 597, 607. 
14. Codification initiatives galvanized political debate across the nineteenth century. 
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw: 1870-1960, at 117-121 
(1992); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 8 (1992) ("Inspired by Euro-
pean precedents, proposals for need-based old-age pensions, for health and unemploy-
ment insurance covering wage earners, and for labor regulations to protect all adult male 
workers received considerable intellectual justification and political support in the eariy-
twentieth-century United States."). 
15. See infra Part II. 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
18. See infra Part IV. 
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II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY ANTECEDENTS: CONTINENTAL LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES AND AMERICAN LIBERTI 
The theme of the civil law's alleged incompatibility with Ameri-
can liberty recurs through the writings of some of the nineteenth cen-
tury's most prominent legal scholars. Early in the century, the status 
of the civil law tied to a larger debate on the nature of the American 
legal system following its separation from England. A particularly in-
fluential voice in this connection was that of James Kent whose Com-
mentaries on American Law addressed the proper role of Roman civil 
law in American jurisprudence at significant length.19 Learned in 
continental law, Kent found much to admire in that system's treat-
ment of "subjects relating to private rights and personal contracts."20 
As a judge, he expressed willingness to be guided by "foreign jurists" 
in the absence of governing English law.21 But he drew a sharp line 
against such borrowing where the civil law's treatment of "the connex-
ion between the government and the people" was at stake.22 "In every 
thing which concerns civil and political liberty," Kent wrote of the civil 
law, "it cannot be compared with the free spirit of the English and 
American common law."23 
In mid-century, the political theorist Francis Lieber described the 
common law as a cornerstone of what he termed "Anglican liberty," to 
be distinguished from its continental ("Gallican liberty") counter-
part.24 The differences between these two political constructs-and 
the superior protection accorded to civil liberty under Anglican prin-
ciples-is the theme of a treatise, On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 
that Lieber published in 1853. The animating force behind his 1853 
treatise was a defense of the common-law tradition against the threat 
of continental-modeled agendas for political reform.25 
19. JAMES KENT, Of the Civil Law, in 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 481 (Da Capo 
Press 1971) (1826). 
20. Id. at 507. 
21. JOHN THEODORE HORTON,jAMES KENT: A STUDY IN CONSERVATISM 1763-1847, at 272 
(1939). 
22. KENT, supra note 19, at 506. 
23. Id. at 507. 
24. See FRANCIS LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GoVERNMENT 51 & n.l-53 (Theodore 
D. Woolsey ed., Da Capo Press 1972) (3d ed. 1877) (enumerating the ideas, principles, and 
institutions that must be observed to understand "Anglican liberty"). 
25. See id. at 203-14 (arguing that the common law is superior to civil law in areas such 
as personal rights and self government). Against this backdrop, Lieber offered the follow-
ing insight on the significance of the common law: "[A]nd though we should have 
brought from England all else, our liberty, had we adopted the civil law, would have had a 
very precarious existence." Id. at 211. 
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By the end of the century, the question of codification inspired 
an extensive literature on the relative merits of the civil- and common-
law traditions. Among the better-known writings is a pamphlet that 
James C. Carter, who headed the American Bar Association's anti-
codification campaign, published in 1884.26 Codes, Carter wrote, are 
characteristic of states "which have a despotic origin, or in which des-
potic power, absolute or qualified, is, or has been, predominant."27 
This, he argued, was not a coincidence but an intrinsic aspect of the 
political character of code-governed states.28 "In free, popular States, 
the law springs from, and is made by, the people," whereas codes are 
the instrument of a "sovereign [who] must be permitted at every step 
to say what shall be the law."29 In keeping with this theme,John Dillon 
used the Storrs Lectures in 1892 as a forum for "protest against the 
Continentalization of our law," a goal he sought to accomplish byexhib-
iting "the excellences of our legal system as it now exists, with a view to 
show that for the people subject to its rule it is, with all its faults, better 
than the Roman or any other alien system."30 
In 1884, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of 
state legislation modeled after civil-law instruments of criminal proce-
dure in Hurtado v. Califomia. 31 At issue was the use in a capital trial 
for murder of an indictment by information, in lieu of grand jury. 
The constitutional question was whether information-a practice with 
roots in continental civil law-complied with due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Matthews 
framed the decision before him in the following manner: 
The Constitution of the United States was ordained, it is 
true, by descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the tradi-
tions of English law and history; but it was made for an unde-
fined and expanding future, and for a people gathered and 
to be gathered from many nations and of many tongues. 
And while we take just pride in the principles and institu-
tions of the common law, we are not to forget that in lands 
where other systems of jurisprudence prevail, the ideas and 
processes of civil justice are also not unknown. Due process 
of law, in spite of the absolutism of continental governments, 
26. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAw (1884), 
microformed on Nineteenth-Century Legal Treatises, No. 1183 (Research Publications 1994). 
27. Id. at 6. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 6-7. 
30. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAws AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA, at viii 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1994) (1894). 
31. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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is not alien to that code which survived the Roman Empire as 
the foundation of modern civilization in Europe, and which 
has given us that fundamental maxim of distributive jus-
tice-suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing in Magna 
Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right 
and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems 
and of every age; and as it was the characteristic principle of 
the common law to draw its inspiration from every fountain 
of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply 
have been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect 
that the new and various experiences of our own situation 
and system will mould and shape it into new and not less 
useful forms.32 
In highlighting the compatibility of continental systems of govern-
ment with due process of law, Justice Matthews implicitly acknowl-
edged the influence of a competing view limiting due process to the 
institutions of common law. 
In Hurtado, the question was whether constitutional due process 
invalidated legislation implementing civil-law-inspired practices of 
criminal procedure.33 Similarly, the relationship between due process 
and European legal principles was again at issue in Lawrence v. Texas,34 
the first instance where a reference to an ECHR judgment appeared 
in the text of a majority opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court. In 
Hurtado, the controversy focused on the compatibility of European-
inspired legislation with constitutional due process.35 In Lawrence, the 
tables turned and the issue became whether domestic law would sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny in the face of European-inspired concep-
tions of constitutional due process.36 
III. THE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS AND THE CAsE AGAINST LEARNING 
FROM FOREIGN PRECEDENTS 
Within months after Lawrence, the first of a series of proposed 
resolutions against the citing of foreign precedents came before the 
House of Representatives.37 In March of the following year, Reps. 
32. Id. at 530-31. 
33. Id. at 519-20. 
34. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
35. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538. 
36. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573,576-77 (citing to ECHR decisions upholding the right 
of individuals to engage in homosexual activities as persuasive authority to overrule 
precedent) . 
37. H.R. Res. 446, 108th Congo (2003). Representative Jim Ryun together with eight 
co-sponsors introduced the resolution on November 18, 2003. Id. 
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Tom Feeney and Bob Goodlatte introduced a similar resolution38 
which they titled "The Reaffirmation of American Independence 
Resolution."39 Over seventy co-sponsors ultimately signed on to the 
"Reaffirmation Resolution" during the 108th Congress, including 
House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, Majority Whip Roy Blunt, and 
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner.4o The 
Christian Coalition of America is one of a number of conservative po-
litical organizations to have endorsed the Resolution.41 To under-
score the serious political intent behind the initiative, Rep. Feeney 
stated in an interview to MSNBC that, notwithstanding the Resolu-
tion's nonbinding status, Justices who "deliberately ignore Congress' 
admonishment . . . may subject themselves to the ultimate remedy, 
which would be impeachment."42 In February 2005, Rep. Feeney in-
troduced a revised version of the Resolution to the 109th Congress.43 
The next month, Sen. John Cornyn brought an essentially identical 
document before the Senate.44 Senator Cornyn's action came shortly 
after Justice Kennedy specifically commented on the relevance of for-
eign jurisprudence to the Court's constitutional inquiry in Roper v. 
Simmons. 45 The House Judiciary Committee responded by including 
Justice Kennedy in a list of judges whose activities the Committee has 
38. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Congo (2004). 
39. Appropriate Role of Foreign judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing on 
H.R Res. 568 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the JudiCiary, 108th 
Congo 57 app. (2004) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep. J. Randy Forbes). The 
Resolution's introductory section reads as follows: 
Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial determinations 
regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States should not be based on 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign 
judgments, laws, or pronouncements inform an understanding of the original 
meaning of the laws of the United States. 
H.R. Res. 568. 
40. [Transfer Binder 2003-2004] Congo Index (CCH) 30,188 (Apr. 2, 2004). 
41. Christian Coalition of Am., Christian Coalition Endorses Congressman Feeney's/ 
Goodelatte's "Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution" (May 14, 2004), 
http://www.cc.org/content.cfm?id=142. For additional groups and individuals who have 
expressed support for the Reaffirmation Resolution, see Rep. Tom Feeney, Should Ameri-
cans Be Governed by the Laws of Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, or the European Union?, 
http://www.house.gov/feeney/reaffirmation.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
42. Tom Curry, A Flap over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC, Mar. 11, 2004, 
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232. 
43. H.R. Res. 97, 109th Congo (2005). As of August 2005, it had sixty-five co-sponsors. 
Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 109th Congress, H.R. Res. 97, http:/ / 
thomas.loc.gov / cgi-bin/bdquery /z?d109:h.res.00097: (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
44. S. Res. 92, 109th Congo (2005). 
45. 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198-1200 (2005) (finding foreign and international law to be per-
suasive authority in holding juvenile death penalty unconstitutional). 
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targeted for investigation.46 House Majority Leader, Tom DeLay, ex-
plained the reasons in an interview to FOX News Radio: "We've got 
Justice Kennedy writing decisions based upon international law, not 
the Constitution of the United States. That's just outrageous .... "47 
Foreign citations are hardly the only source of strain at the mo-
ment between the Republican leadership in Congress and the federal 
judiciary. The 108th Congress saw the introduction of multiple juris-
diction-stripping bills, some of which passed the House (though not 
the Senate). 48 Additional attempts at court curbing included bills di-
rected at limiting the discretion of federal judges as well as the launch-
ing of investigations against two judges by the House Judiciary 
Committee.49 Against this backdrop, the introduction of congres-
sional resolutions on the inappropriateness of judicial citations to for-
eign judgments may look like "politics as usual." Nonetheless, these 
resolutions stand out in their focus on reasoning rather than result. 
The "Reaffirmation Resolution" prompted the Subcommittee on 
the Constitution to convene special hearings in March 2004 on the 
"Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of 
American Law."50 The Subcommittee invited four experts on consti-
tutional and international law to address the topic. Three of them 
Geremy Rabkin of Cornell University, John Oldham McGinnis of 
Northwestern University School of Law, and Michael Ramsey of the 
University of San Diego Law School) spoke in favor of the Resolution. 
The fourth, Vicki Jackson of Georgetown Law Center, was the only 
one to defend the appropriateness of the Court's foreign citations. 
Two parallel lines of argument are evident in statements made by the 
Congress members and professors who spoke during the hearings 
against the legitimacy of citing foreign case law. The first invoked a 
familiar set of complaints against judicial activism, i.e., separation of 
powers, countermajoritarianism, and original intent. But in addition, 
the hearings reveal a separate, substantive ground, for opposing the 
practice under review. Rather than the alleged conflict between for-
46. DeLay Rips justice Kennedy, FOXNEWS, Apr. 20, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/ 
story/0,2933,154009,00.html. 
47. [d. 
48. See, e.g., Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Congo (2004) (attempt-
ing to strip all federal courts of jurisdiction over certain provisions of the Defense of Mar-
riage Act); (Transfer Binder 2003-2004J Congo Index (CCH) 34,517 (Dec. 30, 2004); see 
alsoAm. Bar Ass'n, Independence of the Judiciary: Court Stripping and Erosion of Judicial 
Discretion (May 10, 2005), http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/erode.html (describ-
ing legislation presented to the 108th Congress that was intended to limit court 
jurisdiction). 
49. Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 48. 
50. Hearings, supra note 39. 
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eign citations and proper judicial roles, the focus here was on a 
deeper tension between the underlying commitments of American 
and European law. 
The argument from judicial activism recurs throughout the hear-
ings' transcripts, in various garbs. A prominent example comes from 
the opening statement by Rep. Steve Chabot (who chaired the 
Subcommittee) : 
Americans' ability to live their lives within clear constitu-
tional boundaries is the foundation of the rule of law and 
essential to freedom. There is no substitute for the unadul-
terated expression of the popular will through legislation en-
acted by duly elected representatives of the American 
people. The foundation of liberty turns to sand, however, 
when American [sic] must look for guidance not only to duly 
enacted statutes by elected legislatures and to decisions of 
American courts faithfully interpreting those statutes, but 
also to the often contradictory decisions of hundreds of 
other organizations worldwide.51 
Representative Steve King sounded a similar warning against going 
down "the path of activism, judicial activism, that sees the future of 
America in a fashion that's not accountable to the voice of the peo-
ple."52 Other Subcommittee members repeated this charge in various 
ways, never specifying why the act of citing the decisions of foreign 
courts is necessarily a form of judicial activism-or why it is inherently 
any more deplorable than other such forms. 53 Thus, at the start of the 
hearings, Rep. Chabot offered the following description of the prob-
lem at hand, apparently confident in the proposition's self-evident na-
ture: "[T] oday an alarming new trend is becoming clear: Judges, in 
interpreting the law, are reaching beyond even their own imagina-
tions to the decisions of foreign institutions to justify their 
decisions. "54 
The task of articulating the actual mechanism by which foreign 
citations exacerbated judicial activism fell to the three professors who 
51. [d. at 3 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution). 
52. [d. at 8 (statement of Rep. Steve King, Member, H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution) . 
53. For example, Rep. Jim Ryun stated that "[t]he Court's usage of international law 
and opinions in decisions is completely incompatible with our democratic values and the 
proper role of the courts in our constitutional system." [d. at 7 (statement of Rep. Jim 
Ryun). 
54. [d. at 1 (statement of Rep. Steve Chabot, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution) . 
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testified in favor of the Resolution. All three focused in this connec-
tion on the capacity of judges to pick and choose among available 
foreign precedents as the primary culprit. 'Judges," as McGinnis ar-
gued, "are likely to use their own discretion in choosing what foreign 
law to apply and what foreign law to reject. Judges will use foreign law 
as a cover for their discretionary judgments."55 Ramsey offered a simi-
lar claim, 56 as did Rabkin who stated: 
One of the main reasons why judges cite precedents is to 
demonstrate that their decisions are not simply based on 
their own personal preferences but follow, in some way, from 
recognized legal standards. If foreign rulings are relevant 
guides to the law, then judges have a much larger range of 
precedents to choose from-or to hide behind. 57 
As Rabkin's statement makes evident, the alleged connection be-
tween foreign precedents and judicial activism begins with skepticism 
regarding the sincerity of judicial reasoning as such. To the extent 
that judicial opinions are seen as post hoc rationalizations for precon-
ceived results, foreign precedents increase the quantity of available 
sources on which judges are able to draw. They do not, however, alter 
what is already understood to be an instrumentalist mode of judicial 
reasoning. If judicial citations to domestic precedents are not to be 
taken seriously, the urgency of attending to the practice of foreign 
citations becomes difficult to see. 
This challenge carries over to efforts to ground opposition to for-
eign precedents in the Framers' original intent. The participant who 
put the most emphasis on this argument during the hearings was Mc-
Ginnis. His written statement58 offered in brief an account of why 
originalism was the correct interpretive approach as a matter of demo-
cratic theory. Once this proposition is accepted, the inappropriate-
ness of citing foreign precedents follows by definition. Contemporary 
foreign precedents, after all, can shed little light on the Framers' orig-
55. Id. at 32 (statement of John Oldham McGinnis, Professor, Northwestern University 
School of Law). 
56. See id. at 20 (statement of Michael D. Ramsey, Professor of Law, University of San 
Diego Law School) ("It seems clear that the justices and the academic commentators who 
support them want to use foreign materials not on the basis of any principle appropriate, 
but merely when they happen to coincide with the justice's own moral and social 
preferences.") . 
57. Id. at 12-13 (statement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professor of Government, Cornell 
University) . 
58. [d. at 30-33 (statement of John Oldham McGinnis, Professor, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law). 
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inal intent.59 The argument is of limited value, however, in ground-
ing the campaign against foreign precedents. This is so because it 
does not offer a clear reason for distinguishing between foreign cita-
tions and the Justices' various other violations of originalist interpre-
tive principles. 
Elsewhere in his testimony, McGinnis hinted at a different and 
highly instructive variation on the argument from original intent. As-
suming arguendo that the Framers intended "that the cruel and unu-
sual clause should be tied to evolving standards in general," McGinnis 
argued that" [i) t does not follow that the Framers would have wanted 
to tie these evolving standards to the standards of other nations 
around the world rather than focus only on domestic evolution."60 
The reason, as he explained, derives from the "self-conscious excep-
tionalism of the United States" at its inception.61 "At the time the 
Constitution was framed the United States was one of the few republi-
can nations in the world and the Framers often distinguished its prac-
tices from the world's ancien regimes."62 This outlook, McGinnis 
concludes, would have made the Framers very unlikely to pin the fu-
ture development of the Bill of Rights on the practices of other na-
tions because "[ t] hey would have no confidence that those standards 
would not represent retrogression rather than progress."63 To the ex-
tent that the protection of American exceptionalism is understood to 
be part of the original American constitutional project, all manner of 
legal borrowing from Europe becomes constitutionally suspect. 
Viewed through this lens, it is in the very act of introducing European 
legal norms into American law that foreign precedents violate original 
constitutional intent. 
Moving from eighteenth-century Europe to that of the twenty-first 
century, the Resolution's supporters highlighted a range of ways that 
Americans and Europeans differ to this day. For Rabkin, the most 
outspoken on this issue among the three, fundamental differences in 
American and European conceptions of the "importance of self-de-
fense" provided the cause for alarm.64 "American courts," Rabkin tes-
tified, "have generally been very deferential to the President and 
Congress when it comes to basic questions about military opera-
59. [d. at 31. 
60. [d. at 33. 
61. [d. 
62. [d. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. at 13-14 (statement of Jeremy Rabkin, Professor of Government, Cornell 
University). 
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tions."65 By contrast, European courts have tended to exercise less 
such deference.66 Once we begin to look to European law on matters 
such as capital punishment or homosexual rights, "[il t is only a short 
step . . . to the notion that European opinion must be considered 
when our courts decide on the legality or constitutionality of Ameri-
can responses to the challenge of terrorism. "67 
Conversely, Ramsey warned against the possibility that Europe's 
legal influence would weaken the protection of some rights. His argu-
ment in this connection proceeded in two steps. The first posited that 
"[ilf U.S. courts adopt a practice of relying on foreign materials, we 
would expect that foreign materials be treated as authoritative guides 
as a general matter."68 In other words, they may not pick and choose 
and must adopt an all-or-nothing approach. This would entail, he ar-
gued, retreat from domestically established rights that other systems 
of law have failed to recognize. The list of such rights included free-
dom of speech, freedom of religion, the right to own property, and 
the right to bear arms.69 The two place-specific examples offered in 
illustration pertained to Europe, "where many countries have an es-
tablished church or explicitly 'Christian' parties," and frequently offer 
"lesser protections for the free exercise of religion (as the controversy 
in France over headscarves and other religious headgear suggests)."70 
Presumably, consistent borrowing of European law would require 
adoption of these and similar limitations on established American 
rights. The alternative (and, to Ramsey's mind, more likely) outcome 
would be a more selective approach to borrowing. 71 This approach 
would avoid the pitfall of wholesale importation of foreign law but by 
definition would inappropriately limit citations to those that happen 
to support a particular result. 72 
Finally, McGinnis argued that "the problem with using foreign 
decisions" is that they cannot be viewed in isolation of "a whole set of 
norms and governmental structures" from which they emerged.73 Of-
fering Lawrence as an example, McGinnis noted in his written state-
65. Id. at 14. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 26 (statement of Michael D. Ramsey, Professor of Law, University of San 
Diego Law School). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 32 (statement of John Oldham McGinnis, Professor, Northwestern University 
School of Law). 
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ment to the Subcommittee that "European traditions are more 
favorable than American traditions to the imposition of elite moral 
views. Indeed, the European notion of human rights in constitution-
alism is fundamentally different from ours: human rights in Europe 
are the product of a search for eternal normative truths to be imposed 
against democracy."74 To this, he added in oral testimony: "And, 
therefore, it can be quite misleading to try to transplant the European 
decision into the American context, because we have a whole set of 
different institutions for creating norms.,,75 
Jackson, the only invited guest to oppose the Resolution, posited 
at the start of her statement a very different picture of the Founders' 
attitude towards the foreign political systems of their time: "Far from 
being hostile to considering foreign countries' views or laws, the 
Founding generation of our Nation had what the signers of the Decla-
ration of Independence described as a 'decent Respect to the Opin-
ions of Mankind.' "76 In this connection, Jackson quoted from 
Federalist No. 63 on the importance of "attention to the judgment of 
other nations.'>77 But ultimately, her opposition to the Resolution 
rested not on history but on its interference with the independence of 
the judiciary: 
Efforts by the political branches to prescribe what precedents 
and authorities can and cannot be considered by the Court 
in interpreting the Constitution in cases properly before it 
would be inconsistent with our separation of powers system. 
It could be seen both here and elsewhere as an attack on the 
independence of the courts in performing their core adjudi-
catory activities.78 
Those who spoke in favor of the Resolution were ultimately un-
able to provide a countervailing separation-of-powers argument ade-
quate to justify congressional intervention in processes of judicial 
reasoning. None of the arguments put forth were sufficient to distin-
guish foreign precedents from other modes of non-originalist consti-
tutional reasoning. Instead, what seemed to make this mode of 
judicial reasoning so egregious was its capacity to transplant prohib-
ited European constitutional principles into the United States. The 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 29. 
76. [d. at 16 (statement of Vicki C.Jackson, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center). 
77. [d. (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 63, at 382 Oames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961)). 
78. [d. at 18. 
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following section points to parallel lines of argument in the opinion of 
Justice Scalia in Printz v. United States.79 
IV. SCALIA ON EUROPEAN FEDERALISM AND THE FRAMERS' INTENT 
Printz marked the opening of an ongoing exchange between Jus-
tices Scalia and Breyer on the constitutional relevance of foreign law. 
The case addressed the constitutionality of a provision of the Brady 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act80 that required state law enforce-
ment officials to inquire into the criminal record of prospective gun 
purchasers.81 Justice Scalia's m~ority opinion invalidated the rule as 
unconstitutional federal "commandeering" of the authority of state of-
ficials.82 In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that a commitment to feder-
alism is not inconsistent with the enforcement of federal laws through 
constituent units and offered the federal systems of Switzerland, Ger-
many, and the European Union as examples. "[T]heir experience," 
Justice Breyer noted, "may ... cast an empirical light on the conse-
quences of different solutions to a common legal problem-in this 
case the problem of reconciling central authority with the need to 
preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller constituent gov-
ernmental entity."83 Justice Scalia responded by labeling Justice 
Breyer's mode of "comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to 
the task of writing one."84 The Framers paid considerable attention to 
existing models of European federalism, but they did so only to reject 
them as "subversive of the order and ends of civil pOlity."85 The lesson 
to be taken from the Framers' rejection of the available models is that 
"our federalism is not Europe's," Justice Scalia wrote, and as such con-
temporary models of European federalism are irrelevant to American 
constitutional interpretation today.86 
Sanford Levinson questioned the logic of this argument by not-
ing that rejection of available models during the eighteenth century 
says nothing regarding the relevance of contemporary European ex-
79. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
80. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993). 
81. Printz., 521 U.S. at 902. 
82. See id. at 935 (holding that Congress cannot circumvent the prohibition on compel-
ling states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program by conscripting state officer 
directly). 
83. Id. at 977 (Breyer, j., dissenting). 
84. Id. at 921 n.lI (majority opinion). 
85. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 20 Games Madison and Alexander Hamilton), 
supra note 77, at 138). 
86. Id. 
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amples to American constitutional inquiry.87 If anything, the histori-
cal lesson to be taken from the Framers' examination of foreign 
models (notwithstanding their subsequent rejection) is of the signifi-
cance they accorded to cross-national comparison. "One obviously 
might find the specifics of foreign experience repellant, as Justice 
Scalia argues was the actual case, but this scarcely seems to entail a 
permanent closing off from the potential of future enlightenment."88 
The difference between Justice Scalia's and Levinson's reading of 
the pertinent Federalist Papers cuts to the crux of the controversy. Lev-
inson highlights the Founders' interest in the political experience of 
other nations. Justice Scalia, by contrast, sees their negation of these 
models as key. At least where the structure of American federalism is 
concerned, Europe stands in Justice Scalia's account as the rejected 
alternative against which American constitutionalism emerged. Op-
position to contemporary learning from Europe is consistent with this 
world view. 
V. TRADING PLACES 
The contemporary controversy surrounding foreign citations in 
judicial decisions shares a common jurisprudential question with that 
which occupied the nineteenth-century Court in Hurtado and other 
cases: the relationship between constitutional due process and conti-
nental law. In both eras, opponents of governance approaches with 
roots in civil law asserted the unconstitutionality of these models. 
Where the controversies of the two eras manifestly differ is in the re-
spective roles accorded to judges and legislators. During the nine-
teenth century, opponents of continental-inspired legislation looked 
to the courts to invalidate such laws on due-process grounds. This 
argument was built on the long-standing notion that ever since the 
Magna Charta, the twin terms "due process" and "law of the land" 
have encoded a closed and permanent list of common-law-based sub-
stantive guarantees that ought to trump legislative provisions to the 
contrary.89 By contrast, the contemporary Lawrence citation turns this 
issue on its head. Rather than European-modeled legislation, the con-
troversy surrounds the ostensible role of European constitutional 
principles in undercutting domestic legislation. In the process, 
judges, rather than legislators, have emerged as the controversial 
agents of transnational transplantation. The notion of a fundamental 
87. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflec-
tions, 39 TEX. INT'L LJ. 353, 357 (2004). 
88. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
89. RODNEY L. MaTI', DUE PROCESS OF LAw 241-42 (Da Capo Press 1973) (1926). 
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tension between the offerings of European law and politics and 
American constitutional democracy has, however, remained constant. 
Kim Scheppele has argued for the importance of "negative mod-
els" or "aversive constitutionalism" in shaping the course of transna-
tional constitutional borrowing.90 As she explains, "the aversive 
alternatives, the ones that are so forcefully rejected that they cast their 
influence over the whole constitution-building effort," may matter 
more to constitutional construction than the choice to emulate availa-
ble positive models.91 This insight may be useful not only to the un-
derstanding of the workings of comparative influences in processes of 
constitutional formation but also within subsequent interpretive de-
bates. In some instances, a broad consensus may exist regarding the 
aversive commitments of a particular system. In others, the legitimacy 
of another legal system's inroads may be a matter for controversy and 
the source of deep political divisions. The instrument behind these 
contested transplants may be legislation, as was the case during the 
nineteenth century, or it may take the form of court-to-court fertiliza-
tion as is the situation today. 
To identify this historical continuity is not to argue that the prin-
ciples at issue have remained one and the same. There are cogent 
arguments to be made in favor of the position that "[iJf the views of 
foreign legislatures are relevant, they would surely be relevant to de-
bates in American legislatures, not to judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution."92 In other words, one might support legislative trans-
plantation and oppose court-to-court borrowing without being incon-
sistent. Nonetheless, the parallels between nineteenth-century 
transplantation controversies and those of today can help us under-
stand why the practice of foreign citations has struck such a raw nerve 
in the United States. Notwithstanding much of the rhetoric to that 
effect, judicial activism and separation of powers appear to be tangen-
tial to this debate. The core division is between aversive and inclusive 
constructions of the relationship between Europe's and America's 
constitutional law. 
90. Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Study-
ing Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296, 296-301 
(2003). 
91. Id. at 298. 
92. ROBERT H. BoRK, COERCING VIRTUE 23 (2003). 
